













Association ALTER, Archives Husserl (CNRS-UMR 8547)
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 October 2010





Hanne Jacobs, « I am awake : Husserlian reflections on attention and wakefulness », Alter [Online], 18 |
 2010, Online since 01 June 2020, connection on 29 June 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
















I AM AWAKE : HUSSERLIAN REFLECTIONS 
ON ATTENTION AND WAKEFULNESS 
Hanne Jacobs 
In the chapter on attention in the Principles of Psychology, William James 
writes what on a first reflection might sound rather plausible : Millions of 
items of the outward order are present to my senses which never properly 
enter into my experience. Why? Because they have no interest for me. My 
experience is what I agree to attend to.1 That is, according to James here, 
what I experience is what receives my attention, attracts my gaze, or 
interests me and therefore becomes, is, or remains the object of my 
experience. If this were the case, experiencing would occur neither beyond 
nor apart from attentive interest. What currently falls beyond the scope of 
my attentive interest would not be experienced, nor would any experiencing 
continue when all interested occupation has ceded. In Jamess words : Only 
those items which I notice shape my mind  without selective interest, 
experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light 
and shade, background and foreground  intelligible perspective, in a word. 
It varies in every creature, but without it the consciousness of every creature 
would be a gray chaotic indiscriminateness.2 
If, as James would have it, to experience always involves attention or 
interest that makes discernment possible, then it seems that to experience 
amounts to being awake. That is, the dark and gray chaotic indiscriminateness 
of sleep, fainting spells, or other episodes in which one (temporarily) loses 
the capacity to differentiate and discern seems to preclude the attention or 
interest arising that, according to James, would make experience possible. 
                                                                          
I would like to thank the director of the Husserl-Archives in Leuven, Prof. Dr. Ullrich Melle, for 
his kind permission to quote in the following from Husserls unpublished manuscripts. 
 







However, this identification of experience and wakefulness as well as the 
neat delineation of wakefulness and sleep it entails is phenomenologically 
questionable. 
First, as is well known, from a phenomenological point of view, 
intentional awareness is broader than the specific mode of attentive or 
patent intentionality. That is, if wakefulness is to attend to something, even 
when awake we are never fully awake. If wakefulness is light and day, our 
wakefulness is actually always a wakefulness in an overarching night or 
dark of sleep that entails the intentional awareness of everything to which I 
do not attend, though of which I am nevertheless latently aware. Thus, if 
wakefulness amounts to attentive wakefulness, our waking life is suffused 
by sleep.3 
Second, there also seems to be wakefulness within genuine sleep. That is, 
even though we regularly fall asleep, some have wondered whether we are 
ever fully asleep.4 It seems that the very possibility of waking up 
presupposes that this is not the case. To be able to be awakened by the sun 
lighting up the room or an alarm going off seems to presuppose that one 
was still somehow experiencing the world before one again became (more) 
awake towards it. Consequently, even though asleep, we would still 
somehow experience and in this sense be awake, even if only minimally so.5 
Finally, isnt the dreaming that occurs while we are asleep also a form of 
experiencing? Sleep, which seems to be characterized by a lack of attention 
and discernment, thus still allows for a specific kind of intentional 
experience to occur. So again, experience does not appear to be coextensive 
with attentive or wakeful experience. In the absence of all attention or 
interest, I frequently dream that I am attentive and interested, which is a 
form of intentional awareness, even if not a wakeful and attentive one. 
Thus, from a phenomenological point of view, one can in a certain sense 
speak of sleep within wakefulness as well as wakefulness within sleep. 
Attentive awareness cannot be equated with experience tout court since the 
sleep that pervades our wakeful lives as well as the sleep that dominates our 
lives at night does not preclude experience. Nevertheless, as I hope to show 
in the following, it is only a phenomenology of attention that can elucidate 
what actually characterizes wakefulness. More precisely, it is only a 
                                                                          
3. In his presentation, The Merciful Arrangement at the Philosophy, Phenomenology, 
Sciences conference in 2009 in Leuven, Belgium, Nicolas de Warren developed how Husserl 
uses sleep in this metaphorical way. He also argued there for the careful distinction between 
genuine sleep and sleep as another term for the unconscious that this metaphor might obscure. 
Cf. also Section 2 of the following. I would like to thank the author, Nicolas de Warren, for 
sharing the text of this lecture with me. 
4. See Dan Zahavi, Sleep, Self-Awareness and Dissociation,  Alter. Revue de phénoménologie, 5, 
1997, 137-151. 
5. See Jan Linschoten, On Falling Asleep, in Joseph J. Kockelmans (ed.), Phenomenological 
Psychology. The Dutch School (Dordrecht : Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 110; Anne Montavont, De la 
passivité dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (Paris : PUF, 1999), 68n3. 




consideration of the phenomenon of affection and attention that can make 
clear in what sense we are never fully awake and how wakefulness and the 
sleep within wakefulness is different from genuine sleep. Finally, it is only 
by holding onto Jamess intuition that (wakeful) experience entails attention 
that we can come to understand in what way the intentionality that occurs 
when genuinely asleep, such as dreaming, is radically different from any 
intentional awareness that occurs while awake. 
When phenomenologically exploring the relation between attention and 
wakefulness, one inevitably encounters the ego. As will be elaborated, it is 
the ego living in some acts and not in others while we are awake that 
introduces the difference that seems to be most characteristic of wakeful 
awareness, namely, the difference between foreground and background. 
James thus intuited correctly that attention or interest alone gives accent 
and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground.6 In the 
following, I do not aim to provide an exhaustive account of the phenomena 
of sleep and dreaming. Rather, I hope to indicate how Husserls reflections 
on attentive or patent intentionality and on the differentiation between 
background and foreground that is brought about by attentive interest 
allows us to better understand the distinction between sleep within 
wakefulness and genuine sleep as well as the distinction between the 
intentionality that occurs while awake and when asleep. In this way it 
should also become more clear what wakefulness amounts to. 
1. Wakefulness : Egoic or Patent Intentionality 
Although, from a phenomenological point of view, experience as such 
cannot be equated with attentive or interested experience, our normal 
wakeful experience is in fact attentive or interested.7 According to Husserl, 
to be awake amounts to the ego being awake.8 That the ego is awake means 
                                                                          
6. William James, Principles of Psychology, Volume I, 402-403. 
7. That our normal wakeful experience is interested and attentive is nicely expressed by Husserl 
in a manuscript from 1930 where he writes : Was ist das  Konzentration? Es ist ein Modus 
ichlichen Dabeiseins, des im weitesten Sinne Beschäftigtseins, ein Modus, der eine gewisse 
Gradualität bedeutet, deren höchste Stufe Konzentration, konzentriert Beschäftigtsein 
(wahrnehmend, erinnernd, handelnd Tätigsein) heißen. Das wache Leben ist immerzu ein 
Beschäftigtsein, ein Das-und-jenes-Tun, ein Worauf-aus-Sein in einem Schon-Können [] 
(Manuscript A VI 14 a/11a, my emphasis). In this section, I only address normal wakeful 
awareness and abstract from abnormal experiences, such as the experience of insomnia, 
obsession, and daydreaming. I return to the latter kind of experience in Section 4. 
8. That being awake amounts to the ego being awake is implied in the following passage in 
Ideas II : Keine Wesensnotwendigkeit spricht dagegen, daß ein Bewußtsein durchaus ein 
dumpfes sei. Andererseits gehört dann doch zu ihm, wie zu jedem Bewußtsein überhaupt, die 
unbedingte Wesensmöglichkeit, daß es zum wachen werden kann, daß ein aktueller Ichblick 
sich an einer beliebigen Stelle desselben etabliere in Form eines diesem Bewußtsein sich 





nothing else than that there occurs a specific form of intentional awareness 
in the continuously unfolding stream of conscious awareness, namely 
conscious awareness of the form cogito. As Husserl writes in Ideas I : We can 
define a waking ego as one which, within its stream of lived-experiences, 
continuously effects consciousness in the specific form of the cogito.9 To live 
in an intentional act of the specific mode cogito or, in other words, to live in a 
cogitatio, amounts for Husserl to being thematically aware of something, to 
grasping something (erfassen), or, in short, to attending to something. A 
phenomenological description of our conscious life readily shows that 
intentional acts come in a variety of forms such as perceiving, remembering, 
imagining, but also striving, valuing, and aesthetically appreciating. These 
intentional acts become a cogitatio as soon as I direct myself or become attentive 
to their intentional object, that is, the perceived object, the remembered 
object, the imagined object, the goal of my action, a valued object, or a 
beautiful object.10 
While the language of grasping or directing ones attention connotes 
activity and spontaneity, it is well-known, though not therefore insignificant, 
that Husserl characterizes the thematic intentionality of the form ego cogito in 
terms of receptivity. That is, Husserl makes sure to accentuate that my 
thematic occupation with something in the field of my awareness is an 
answer to an affection to which I am subjected.11 For example, when 
                                                                                                                                        
wiederhole usw. (Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, Husserliana IV, 
Marly Biemel (ed.) (Den Haag : Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), 108). Henceforth Hua IV. 
9. Ein waches Ich können wir als ein solches definieren, das innerhalb seines 
Erlebnisstromes kontinuierlich Bewusstsein in der spezifischen Form des cogito vollzieht 
(Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die 
reine Phänomenologie, Husserliana III/1, Karl Schuhmann (ed.) (Den Haag : Martinus Nijhoff, 
1976), 63). Henceforth Hua III/1. 
10. Jedes cogito, jeder Akt in einem ausgezeichneten Sinne ist charakterisiert als Akt des Ich, 
er geht aus dem Ich hervor, es lebt in ihm aktuell. [] Beobachtend nehme ich etwas 
wahr, in gleicher Weise bin ich in der Erinnerung öfters mit etwas beschäftigt, quasi 
beobachtend verfolge ich in der fingierenden Phantasie das Treiben in der phantasierten Welt. 
Oder ich denke nach, ich ziehe Schlüsse; ich nehme ein Urteil zurück, evtl. mich überhaupt des 
Urteils enthaltend. Ich vollziehe ein Gefallen oder Missfallen, ich freue mich oder bin betrübt, 
ich wünsche, oder ich will und tue; oder auch, ich enthalte mich der Freude, des Wunsches, 
der Wollung und Handlung. Bei all solchen Akten bin ich dabei, aktuell dabei (Hua III/1, 160). 
11. Ziehen wir das Ich, und zwar nur als rezeptiv sich Betätigendes mit heran, so haben wir in 
genetischer Analyse zu beachten, dass der rezipierenden Aktion vorangeht eine Affektion. Eine 
Hintergrundvorstellung, eine gerichtete, affiziert das Ich  darin liegt, es geht eine Tendenz auf 
das Ich  dieses reagiert mit der Zuwendung, die Vorstellung nimmt die Gestalt der 
erfassenden an, in der der Ichblick auf das Gegenständliche gerichtet ist (Edmund Husserl, 
Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten (1918-1926), 
Husserliana XI, Margot Fleischer (ed.), (Den Haag : Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 84). Henceforth Hua 
XI. Also : Aus der Passivität des Hintergrunds her gehen die Affektionen auf das Ich, sie sind 
Voraussetzungen der Zuwendung. Mit ihren Vollzug leistet das Ich der Affektion folge, es 




walking through a museum, my attention is attracted by one painting after 
another; however, I might also be distracted by the glimpse of an additional 
exhibition in an adjoining room, the conversations of others, my untied 
shoelace that I promptly tie again, or a sudden memory of an old friend 
awakened by the likeness of a stranger. 
In each of these cases, my engagement is solicited by something that 
affects me, strikes me, and manages to attract my attention. While the ego is 
thus receptive and in this sense passive, its reaction in the form of attending 
to what affects it is, however, in no case an automated response to the most 
urgent or forceful impulse. I can turn away from the chatter and additional 
exhibition and move on to the next painting. Generally speaking, in addition 
to being affected, I am also interested in some things more than in others, 
which guides the way that I react to what affects me.12 
Moreover, a phenomenological reflection shows that it is essential to the 
structure of our wakeful awareness that I cannot attend to everything at 
once.13 For our present purposes, this has two important implications. First, 
to be awake is to be attentive to something and to be inattentive to 
everything else that is not within the scope of our attention. This 
phenomenological given motivates Husserl to speak of a kind of sleep 
within wakefulness. For example, in a manuscript from March 1931, Husserl 
writes : 
the genuine wakefulness of wakeful ego-Dasein, ego-life consists in the ego living in 
the lived-experiences, being awakened by affections in particular, and being 
wakefully occupied in actions. Nevertheless, this genuine wakefulness is nothing 
                                                                                                                                        
richtet sich auf das Affizierende hin (Edmund Husserl, Aktive Synthesen : Aus der Vorlesung 
Transzendentale Logik 1920/21. Ergänzungsband zu Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, 
Husserliana XXXI, Roland Breeur (ed.) (Dordrecht : Kluwer, 2000), 4). 
12. An important consequence of the given that the ego does not just yield to what is 
qualitatively considered the most forceful or prominent is that a phenomenological analysis 
should distinguish between the qualitative relief of what appears and the affective relief it has 
for me. That is, even though things and events stand out by means of their qualitative features 
(a loud noise, a bright color), this need not entail that I am affected most by these object or 
events or automatically direct my gaze to what stands out the most (I might be submerged in 
reading). Conversely, the qualitatively diffuse and unremarkable might catch my attention. 
Accounting for this difference between a qualitative and affective relief, however, falls beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
13. Die Zahl der in einem gleichzeitigen Bemerken bemerkbaren Objekte ist bekanntlich sehr 
beschränkt (Enge des Bewusstseins oder der Aufmerksamkeit) (Edmund Husserl, 
Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893-1912), Husserliana XXXVIII, 
Thomas Vongehr & Regula Giuliani (eds.) (Dordrecht : Kluwer, 2004), 98). Also : der Erlebnisstrom 
kann nie aus lauter Aktualitäten bestehen (Hua III/1, 63); Zum Wesen des Erlebnisstromes 
eines wachen Ich gehört es aber nach dem oben Gesagten, daß die kontinuierliche fortlaufende 
Kette von cogitationes beständig von einem Medium der Inaktualität umgeben ist, diese immer 
bereit, in dem Modus der Aktualität überzugehen, wie umgekehrt die Aktualität in die Inaktualität 





for itself; it is what it is on the background of non-wakefulness (Unwacheit). In the 
concrete ego, there is a ground layer of sleep.14 
A second implication of the essential given that there is always more that 
affects us than what we can attend to concerns the ego. At a certain point in 
Ideas I, Husserl states that among the universal essential peculiarities 
pertaining to the transcendentally purified realm of lived-experiences, the 
first place is due to the relationship of each lived-experience to the pure 
ego.15 We should be more precise, however, and add that not every lived-
experience actually has this relation to the pure ego, though all intentional 
lived-experiences can acquire such relation to it. If there is more that affects 
me than what I (can) attend to, this amounts to saying that at every moment 
there are intentional lived-experiences in which the ego does not live. These 
are the so-called passive or latent intentional lived-experiences that bring to 
awareness what is not at the center of my thematic occupation, but what 
embraces the theme of my attentive occupation as its horizon. 
Before spelling out the different modes of passive, implicit, or, if you 
wish, non-egoic intentionality, it should be recalled that it is Husserls 
conviction that every passive intentional lived-experience can become a 
patent intentional act or cogitatio. Correlatively, everything that I am 
implicitly aware of, but that does not affect enough to attract my attention, 
can in the next moment become the object of my attentive occupation. In this 
sense, Husserl gives a new spin to the Kantian idiom that the I think must 
be able to accompany all my representations.16 As Husserl writes in 1912 in 
the so-called pencil manuscript of Ideas II : 
That all my representations can be accompanied by the pure ego makes good 
sense, even if not in the Kantian way, if we understand representations here as a 
dark consciousness or in terms of everything that can be considered as belonging to 
the conscious background. In principle, the pure ego can come to live in every 
unaccomplished (in a certain sense unconscious and unwakeful) intentional lived-
experience as well as accomplish anew and bring to the light of wakeful 
                                                                          
14. [] im Ich als in ihnen <den Erlebnissen> lebendes, in den Affektionen in Sonderheit 
gewecktes, in den Aktionen wachtätiges, liegt das eigentlich Wache im wachen Ich-Dasein und 
Ich-Leben. Aber dieses eigentliche Wache ist nichts für sich, es ist, was es ist, auf dem 
Untergrund der Unwachheit. Im konkreten Ich liegt eine Grundschicht des Schlafes. 
(Edmund Husserl, Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934) : Die C-Manuskripte, Husserliana 
Materialien VIII, Dieter Lohmar (ed.) (Dordrecht : Kluwer, 2006), 42). Henceforth HuMa VIII. 
15. Unter den allgemeinen Wesenseigentümlichkeiten des transzendental gereinigten 
Erlebnisgebietes gebührt eigentliche die erste Stelle der Beziehung jeder Erlebnisses auf das 
reine Ich (Hua III/1, 159-160). 
16. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer & Allen Wood (trans.) (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), B 131. 




consciousness intentional lived-experiences that are sunken back into the 
background or have entered the stage of not-any-more accomplished.17 
Thus, each and every latent intentional awareness can take on an egoic or 
patent guise; in this way, the ego can become awake towards what it was 
previously asleep. Noematically speaking, all the objects that remain in the 
background (spatial or temporal) and are currently not the object of our 
focus can enter the scope of wakeful attentiveness. The background can 
consequently be characterized as the field of freedom of the ego out of which 
it can actualize at will and according to its interests.18 
From what has thus far been said, we can conclude that when Husserl 
describes our consciousness as egoic, he does so in order to point to the fact 
that while at any moment a whole spatio-temporal world is given to me and 
a multiplicity of things and other objectivities might affect me, I am always 
only thematically directed at some things or occupied with a limited set of 
themes, namely the ones that are the intentional correlate of the intentional 
act in which the ego lives. Thus, in Husserlian phenomenology, the ego 
differentiates between patent or explicit intentional awareness, on the one 
hand, and latent or implicit intentional awareness, on the other. Introducing 
the ego at the pre-reflective level is thus at least supported by the 
phenomenological evidence that the phenomenal field appears as structured 
with a thematic focus and an implicit background or horizon that leaves me 
indifferent. For as long as we are awake, there is always some act in which 
we are engaged, which differentiates this act as a cogito from the horizon of 
latent or non-egoic intentional lived-experiences. The ego being awake 
introduces the difference between theme and background (or correlatively, 
the difference between the actually accomplished intentional act and a 
horizon of potentially egoic acts) by living out certain interests and 
responding to certain affections while remaining deaf for others. 
In addition to providing phenomenological evidence for the ego, I would 
like to show that the distinction between egoic and non-egoic intentionality 
that characterizes wakefulness also furnishes us with the means to give a 
                                                                          
17. Das reine Ich muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können, das hat einen guten Sinn, 
〈wenn〉 auch nicht den Kantischen, wenn wir unter Vorstellungen hier alles dunkle 
Bewusstsein, alles im Bewusstseinshintergrund Befindliche verstehen. Prinzipiell kann sich das 
reine Ich in alle unvollzogenen (in gewissem festen Sinn unbewussten, unerwachten) 
intentionalen Erlebnisse einleben oder die in den Hintergrund gesunkenen, in das Stadium des 
Nicht-mehr-Vollziehens getretenen zu neuem Vollzug und in das Licht des wachen 
Bewusstseins bringen (Manuscript F III 1/5b). See also Hua IV, 108. 
18. Vermöge der Polarität, die zum Wesen des cogito gehört, ist das wache Ich aktuell bezogen 
auf die Gegenständlichkeiten der cogitationes, die es vollzieht. Sie sind seine Gegenstände, und 
zwar genau als diejenigen, die sie in den betreffenden cogitationes noematisch (vermeinte, 
gesetzte und quasi-gesetzte) sind. Potentiell gilt das aber von den Gegenständen der 
unvollzogenen Noesen, die im Hintergrund schlummern und die sozusagen das Feld der 
Freiheit des Ich ausmachen; und ihre Gegenstände bilden das Blickfeld des Ich (Manuscript F 





convincing phenomenological account of genuine sleep and of the difference 
between our wakeful intentional awareness and dreaming at night. Before I 
can further elaborate how so, it is important to understand in which way 
genuine sleep differs from the underground of sleep that carries any 
wakeful directedness. So, what are the different kinds of passive or non-
egoic intentionality that Husserl sometimes analogically refers to as sleep 
and that necessarily accompany our egoic thematic directedness?  
2. The Phenomenological Unconscious : Non-Egoic 
or Latent Intentionality 
In Husserls writings, we can discern a genuine phenomenological 
concept of the unconscious. Generally stated, the unconscious is a passive, 
implicit, or latent mode of conscious awareness that accompanies our 
explicit awareness.19 This latent mode of intentionality should be contrasted 
with the attentive or patent intentionality that characterizes the cogitations 
since it is a form of intentionality in which the ego does not live (anymore). 
The unconscious is thus a specific mode of consciousness, namely an 
unconscious consciousness.20 The term unconscious does not mean that 
this implicit mode of consciousness would not entail self-awareness; rather, 
an act of consciousness is latent, passive, or unconscious when the 
intentional object of this act does not affect enough or does not affect 
anymore as to become or to be the theme of my attention. This unconscious 
or latent form of consciousness is not merely a construction and it is not just 
                                                                          
19. For example in the following passage out of the so-called C-manuscripts, Husserl speaks of 
the unconscious or, better, unconsciousness with regard to the latent awareness of the spatial 
background : Das Thematische, das, wobei das Ich in verschiedenen Modis ist, womit es sich 
beschäftigt. Das Implizite im Thema  die impliziten affizierenden Momente (für die es kein 
Ohr hat), letztlich die impliziten Null-affektionen  das dem Ich Unbewusste. In der Totalität 
der strömenden Gegenwart eine Totalität von Nullaffektion, das totale Null : Hintergrund des 
Unbewussten. [] Es ist zu scheiden das in den jeweiligen Themen Implizite, Affektionslose, 
das aber doch eben im Thema implizite zu Worte kommt, andererseits außerhalb des Themas, 
<der> Hintergrund (Nacht des Unbewussten), aber ein Hintergrund, der doch affektiv werden 
kann. Wachbewusstsein immerzu, Bewusstsein im eigentlichen Sinn, immerzu ein thematischer 
Bereich (Tag). Das Thematische <hat> seinen inneren Nullhorizont und seinen äußeren (HuMa 
VIII, 184). Similarly with regard to the temporal background or retained: Die retentionale 
Abwandlung [] vom gegenständlichen Standpunkt []: Vom selben wird immer weniger 
affektiv. Und wenn von verschiedenen Gegenständen nichts affektiv wird, so sind diese 
verschiedenen in eine einzige Nacht untergetaucht, im besonderen Sinn unbewußt geworden 
(Hua XI, 172). 
20. Bewusstsein im allerweitesten Sinn, von dem sogar das Null des Bewusstseins, das 
Unbewusstsein ein Modus ist (HuMa VIII, 193). With regard to retention specifically, Husserl 
writes: Hinsichtlich der Urgegenwart ist zu sagen, daß das Unbewußtsein in ihr Bewußtsein 
ist; das unbewußte sinnliche Objekt ist mit allen anderen unbewußten sinnlichen Objekten in 
einem Nullbewußtsein ununterschieden bewußt (Hua XI, 388). 




concluded to since its presence can be traced in the phenomena. In order to 
see how this is the case, I propose we take a look at three different forms of 
unconscious consciousness : background awareness, retentional awareness, 
and so-called secondary passivity. 
We have already differentiated between the theme of our explicit 
intentional awareness and its background. Within the spatial background 
itself, however, Husserl makes a further, threefold distinction : (1) The 
complete unconscious or absolute zero; (2) what remains unnoticed, 
though could be noticed, what affects, but does not pierce through with its 
voice; and (3) that with which the ego is engaged, though not primarily, 
rather with which it is still engaged.21 
The so-called zero-horizon (Nullhorizont) of affection comprises whatever 
in the present field of awareness does not make an affective appeal on the 
ego or did not just do so. Nevertheless, this completely silent or dark 
background does contribute to what makes an appeal, did just make an 
appeal, and manages to attract our attention. The zero of affection is thus not 
to be understood in a merely privative way. This affective nothingness of the 
background is a condition for the possible occurrence of a receptive 
awareness of intentional objects such as perceptual objects in their different 
aspects as well as goals that one intends to realize in actions. That is to say, 
we hear and see what is in the foreground because the background remains, 
to a large extent, silent.22 
While most of what remains in the spatial background does not affect, it 
does appear since the perceptual field is at every wakeful moment filled out 
in its entirety, even if it recedes in favor of what plays out in the 
foreground.23 To be precise, however, the spatial background or horizon 
transcends what appears within the perceptual field at any given moment. 
That is, there is more to the unconscious or implicit horizon of my 
intentional object of focus than what appears intuitively. What does not 
appear, but is co-intended or co-present, such as the backside of the object in 
focus or the invisible aspects of the objects in the background, as well as the 
invisible surroundings, belong to the horizon of the perceived object that is 
                                                                          
21. 1) das absolute Unbewusste, das absolute Null; 2) das Unbeachtete, obschon 
Merkliche, affizierend, nicht mit seiner Stimme durchdringend; 3) das, womit das Ich zu tun 
hat, nicht primär, sondern nur noch zu tun <hat> (HuMa VIII, 184). 
22. Car si je suis conscient de tout, je ne suis conscient de rien; pour quil y ait conscience de 
quelque chose, il faut quil ny ait pas conscience de tout (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Linstitution 
de la passivité. Notes de cours au Collège du France (1954-1955), Dominique Darmaillacq, Claude 
Lefort, Stéphanie Ménasé (eds.) (Belin, 2003), 158). 
23. Ich bin weiter nicht gerichtet auf den gegenständlichen Hintergrund, der in eins mit 
meinem erfassten Ding als Einheit des gegenwärtigen Wahrnehmungsfeld auch erscheint als 
Erscheinungseinheit (Edmund Husserl, Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und 
ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916-1937), Husserliana, XXXIX, Rochus Sowa (ed.) 





an up to a certain extent determined, prefigured, or at least determinable 
horizon. 
Husserls threefold differentiation within the spatial background of my 
thematic directedness already indicates that the spatial background cannot 
be thought apart from the horizon in its temporal dimension. More 
precisely, that with which the ego was and is still engaged, though which 
is not anymore the focal point of its interest, is that which is retained along 
with everything else of which I was just previously impressionally aware. 
As is well known by phenomenologists, retention is a specific modification 
of our impressional awareness of the present now that by necessity 
accompanies every impressional awareness. Specifically, with every new 
impressional present, the previous impressional present is retained by 
means of a certain holding back of the past impressional awareness in the 
moment of the new impressional present.24 Due to this retentional 
modification, our awareness is one of objects that endure in time  identical 
objects that appear to us as identical throughout temporally distinct phases. 
Without retentional consciousness, we would be left with a mere succession 
of perceptions without ever perceiving succession or duration. 
Like in the case of the spatial horizon, Husserl introduces within the 
temporal horizon a distinction between the unconscious proper and that 
which still somehow exerts affection.25 The distinction is the one between 
so-called near and far retention.26 Near or living retentions that contribute to 
what appears in the temporally extended present can still claim some 
intuitiveness and delineation and cannot yet be called an unconscious mode 
of awareness. I am aware of what is retained in this living or fresh way if I 
                                                                          
24. Of this retentional awareness, Husserl writes more specifically: es vergegenwärtigt nicht 
in der Weise einer Wiedererinnerung, aber es vergegenwärtigt oder hält zurück, was vorher in 
der Weise des Jetzt, in einer Urempfindung bewußt war, es hält es zurück in Form eines neuen 
und stetig aus dem Urempfinden hervorgehenden Modus. In gewisser Weise vergegenwärtigt 
es aber den früher im Modus des Jetzt bewußten Zeitpunkt dadurch, dass es die Urempfindung 
vorstellig macht (Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917), 
Husserliana X, Rudolf Boehm (ed.) (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 376). Henceforth Hua X. 
There is still awareness of that which was just given as now, because the primal sensation or 
original impression is retained or reproduced. This reproduction of the original impression 
results in the retentional structure of consciousness having a double intentionality which makes 
clear how consciousness synthesizes itself through time: Jede Bewusstseinsabschattung der Art 
Retention hat, antworte ich, eine doppelte Intentionalität: einmal die für die Konstitution des 
immanenten Objekts, des Tones dienende, d.i. diejenige, die wir Erinnerung an den (soeben 
empfundenen) Ton nennen; die andere ist die für die Einheit dieser primären Erinnerung im 
Fluss konstitutive, nämlich, die Retention ist in eins damit, dass sie Erinnerung an den Ton ist, 
Reproduktion der verflossenen Ton-Empfindung, genauer der Urempfindung (Hua X, 379). 
25. Unterscheidung zwischen der Sphäre aktueller Retention und der Sphäre des 
Sedimentierte, des im spezifischen Sinne Unbewussten (HuMa VI, 376). 
26. On the distinction between near and far retention see Lanei Rodemeyer, Intersubjective 
Temporality. Its About Time (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 86-92. See also Nicolas de Warren, The 
Promise of Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 182. 




still have a perceptual hold on the retained (perception being understood in 
a wide sense here). When listening to a lecture or a musical performance, 
with every new word or note, I am still aware of the preceding words and 
notes although more and more indeterminately and less and less clearly or 
intuitively. 
However, it is a consequence of the incessant upsurge of new 
impressions and the subsequent ongoing modification of the retained that at 
some point the retained will lose its living connection to the living present  
the melody ends and the retained inevitably loses its affective force.27 This 
becoming unconscious of the speech or the melody necessarily goes hand in 
hand with a loss in both the intuitiveness (Anschaulichkeit or Klarheit) and 
distinctness (Abgehobenheit or Deutlichkeit) of the way in which the retained is 
given. Nevertheless, the completely empty and undifferentiated retention of 
the past is still a representation, even if an unconscious one.28 The 
reactivation of the past in a later present in the form of an explicit 
recollection bears witness to this implicit preservation of the past in the 
retentional awareness accompanying our impressional awareness.29 
It is not only our different modes of receptive intentional awareness that 
are subjected to the passage of time; our specifically spontaneous acts, such 
as judgments, practical decisions, and resolutions or wishes are as well. With 
regard to the sedimentation of our acts of judging, practically deciding, and 
desiring, Husserl speaks of secondary passivity.30 While these acts of 
                                                                          
27. Das Ende ist also völlige Unterschiedslosigkeit, Unterschiedslosigkeit aus völliger 
affektiver Kraftlosigkeit (Hua XI, 170). The retained is not alive anymore, it is sedimented in 
the reservoir of the unbestimmten, ununterschiedenen, völlig dunklen Gesamtvergangenheit 
(Hua XI, 388). 
28. Und doch, in der Kontinuität dieses Prozesses hat der Sinn sich identisch erhalten, er hat 
sich nur verhüllt, er ist aus explizitem Sinn zu einem impliziten geworden (Hua XI, 174). 
29.Weckung ist möglich, weil der konstituierte Sinn im Hintergrundsbewußtsein in der 
unlebendigen Form, die da Unbewußtsein heißt, wirklich impliziert ist (Hua XI, 179). More 
precisely, the awakening of the retained results from an association that radiates from the 
present (e.g. the stranger in front of me reminds me of somebody else), which, if carried out to 
full wakefulness, results in the fulfillment of the empty retention in the intuitive act of 
recollection (e.g. I recollect explicitly my old friend that this stranger reminds me of). This 
recollection can consequently be characterized as bloße Reproduktion dessen, was schon im 
Unbewußten da ist (Hua XI, 193). 
30. Das Urteil kann aber auch in seinem retentionalen Abklingen aus dem Griff gelassen 
werden. Es sinkt dann immer weiter zurück in den Hintergrund und wird in eins damit immer 
verschwommener; der Grad seiner Abgehobenheit wird stufenweise immer geringer, bis es 
schließlich ganz dem Bereich des aktuellen Bewußtseins entschwindet, vergessen wird. Es ist 
nun dem passiven Hintergrund, dem Unbewußten einverleibt, das kein totes Nichts, sondern 
ein Grenzmodus des Bewußtseins des Ich ist, und kann von daher wie eine andere Passivität 
wieder affizieren in Form von Einfällen, vorschwebenden Gedanken usw. Das Urteil ist in 
dieser Modifikation aber nicht eine ursprüngliche, sondern eine sekundäre Passivität, die 





spontaneous and rational activity sink back and make room for new acts like 
any act of perception or recollection would, their intentional accomplishment 
is sedimented in a peculiar way. That is, according to Husserl, when 
judging, evaluating, or deciding in favor of something, we take a stance 
(Stellungnahme). When this position-taking sinks into the background of the 
unconscious, however, the position-taking is not just retained; what was 
posited in the spontaneous act also retains its validity. That is, when I 
perform a spontaneous position-taking with regard to the being, value, or 
desirability of an object or person, I experience this object in the future as 
appearing with the posited validity, even after my position-takings as 
intentional lived-experiences have sunken back into the past. 
In addition to being retained in the way that any act of consciousness is, 
the position-taking endures by means of the enduring validity of its 
constitutive result. As Husserl writes : When I posit something as valid in 
an affirmative and judicative manner, I mean by this that it is settled for me 
from now on, as established for the future, and in particular, as being in this 
way or that.31 To be sure, not all validities originate in my own activity and 
most of what I believe to be the case, valuable, or worth striving for has 
originated in others. Because we experience and partake in the 
sedimentation of validities to which previous generations have contributed, 
we experience our world as a historical one, which frames any situation and 
event we encounter within this world. 
The three described complementary forms of implicit or unconscious 
consciousness contribute to what is experienced explicitly at present in such 
a way that we always perceive more than what is, strictly speaking, given at 
any moment because we experience it as informed by our past awareness 
and activity. Due to the constitutive contribution of the spatio-temporal 
historical horizon, we do not just perceive what occupies us at present, we 
perceive it within a world, even if at any moment only a segment of this 
world is given to us and we disregard the worldly horizon in favor of what 
attracts our attention within it. 
Thus, while awake to something within the world, we remain asleep with 
regard to the world or horizon in its spatial, temporal, and historical 
dimension. This sleeping or unconscious background-awareness accompanies 
our every wakeful attentiveness to what figures on the foreground. As I 
would like to show, genuine sleep, on the other hand, seems to be 
characterized by the disappearance of the distinction between foreground 
and background and by the disappearance of the ego.32 
                                                                                                                                        
(Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, Ludwig 
Landgrebe (ed.) (Hamburg: Claassen & Goverts, 1948), 336). 
31. Was ich positiv urteilend in Geltung setze, meine ich damit als für mich von nun ab 
feststehend, als für die Zukunft festgestellt, und zwar als seiend oder so-seiend (Hua XI, 55). 
32. Anne Montavont distinguishes in another way between genuine sleep and the 
unconsciousness by distinguishing between two kinds of unconsciousness, one before and 




3. Genuine Sleep : The Absence of the Ego 
Any philosophy of consciousness inevitably encounters some difficulty 
when attempting to account for the (non-) phenomenon of deep dreamless 
sleep.33 In general, Husserl thinks of sleep as a universal modification of 
conscious life, a modification that can be easily elucidated by considering the 
role of the ego. That is, when falling asleep, the differentiation between 
foreground and background disappears. Husserl writes : Our wakeful 
consciousness can cede, it can be interrupted periodically by a sleeping, 
completely mute consciousness without distinction between the actual range 
of vision and a dark background. Everything is background, everything is 
dark.34 In other words, when asleep, the ego does not perform explicit acts 
in the form of the ego cogito; nothing affects enough in order to attract 
attention, nothing is explicitly grasped. The ego is absent, which shows itself 
in the total lack of interest that characterizes the state of sleep. As Husserl 
writes : What characterizes falling asleep is the universality of the 
becoming passive of the ego as the ego of interests.35 My falling asleep is a 
letting go where I retire completely and lose all interest.36 If certain concerns 
                                                                                                                                        
beyond wakefulness and another within wakefulness (Anne Montavont, De la passivité dans la 
phénoménologie de Husserl, 174). It seems, however, that genuine (dreamless) sleep is better 
characterized as Bewusstlosigkeit (the absence of intentional consciousness) and that the term 
Unbewusstsein is better reserved for denoting the latent intentionality that accompanies our 
patent or wakeful awareness. 
33. For a bibliography on sleep and dreams in the history of philosophy and Husserls 
phenomenology in particular see Alter. Revue de phénoménologie, 5, 1997, 155-164. For how 
accounting for (continuity through) sleep could present a challenge to phenomenology see also 
my Towards a Phenomenological Account of Personal Identity, in Philosophy, Phenomenology, 
Sciences: Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl, C. Ierna, H. Jacobs, and F. Mattens (eds.) 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2010). 
34. Unser waches Bewusstsein kann abgelöst sein, kann streckenweise unterbrochen sein 
durch ein schlafendes, völlig stummes, ohne Unterschied zwischen aktuellem Blickfeld und 
dunklen Hintergrund. Alles ist Hintergrund, alles ist Dunkel (Manuscript F III 1/5a). See also 
Hua IV, 107. 
35. Das Eigentümliche des Einschlafens ist also die Universalität des Passivwerdens des Ich als 
Interessen-Ich (Hua XXXIX, 591). Also Eugen Fink writes: Aporetisch könnte man sagen: 
offenbar ist Schlaf kein Erlebnis, es fehlt ihm die Ich-polarisierung, es fehlt im Ganzen die 
noetisch-noematische Korrelation, though he also warns Daß Schlafen ein bestimmter Modus 
des Gegenwärtigens ist, daß ferner Ichlichkeit als Strukturpol der Erlebnisse nur eine 
Eigenheit der wachen, d.h. der eigentlich konstituierenden Subjektivität ist und in welchem 
Sinne die Zeitlichkeit das ursprünglichste Wesen des transzendentalen Erlebnisstromes 
ausmacht,  das zu zeigen sind wir hier noch lange nicht zugerüstet (Eugen Fink, Studien zur 
Phänomenologie. 1930-1939 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 64). 
36. Es fehlt das Interesse; das soeben noch Geweckte aus noch fungierender Assoziation unter 
Interesse, das wirkt gar nicht mehr auf das Ich. Dieses nimmt keine Richtung darauf hin, es hat 
nun überhaupt keine Richtung mehr auf etwas hin, es ist eben ohne Interesse dafür, es ist ohne 





do seem to endure while asleep,37 this can only be because the letting go of 
all interests that characterizes complete sleep is more of a limit-case than an 
actual state we fall into as soon as we fall asleep.38 
In the context of what has been said about the relation between 
foreground-awareness and background-awareness, we inevitably have to 
raise the following question : does the disappearance of any interest or 
intentional occupation mean that the background-awareness that normally 
accompanies our egoic intentionality now becomes all-encompassing? Or, 
on the contrary, does it only make sense to speak of a background in 
contrast and relation to what is conscious in the strict sense or attended to, 
that is, in relation to a foreground? In other words, is sleep like the partial 
sleep occurring within wakefulness, but without thematic awareness? From 
a phenomenological point of view, it seems that when falling asleep it is not 
only patent intentionality that cedes, but our latent intentional awareness as 
well. Moreover, as I aim to show in the final section, only an account that 
can make the distinction between sleep at night and the implicit horizonal 
consciousness that accompanies wakeful awareness in the strict sense can 
guarantee the distinction between wakeful intentionality and dreaming 
while asleep. 
At first sight, Husserls description of falling asleep seems strikingly 
similar to his descriptions of one of the three forms of unconsciousness 
discussed, namely retention. Of the retentional modification of every 
impressional awareness, Husserl frequently speaks in terms of impoverishment 
(Verarmung), concealment (Verhüllung), lack of differentiation, and diminution 
of affective force. The melody fades out and soon my lively awareness of it 
does as well. In the following passage, falling asleep is described by Husserl 
in similar terms : In the dark, the content of consciousness is impoverished, 
a dark field of vision, in bed the tactile content is impoverished, an 
undifferentiated sensing [] the fields of sense become totally uniform.39 
Thus, retention and falling asleep are both characterized by an impoverishment 
of differentiation (uniformity) and intuitiveness (darkness) and therefore of 
affecting force. 
                                                                                                                                        
ist im Nirwana, sein Wille, sein Tun ist Ersterben des Interesses, es wird von nichts bewegt, d.i. 
als von nichts im Interesse Berührtes, als Interesseloses bewegt es sich nicht, tut es nichts, 
erfährt es nichts, es sieht nichts, hört nichts, handelt nichts etc. (Manuscript A VI 14a/12a-b). 
37. Think of the much referred to phenomenon of waking up every hour the night before an 
important early appointment or the examples of the mother who awakens on the slightest cry of 
her child and the greedy man who slept through everything but was awakened by a single coin 
being placed in his hand. See Jan Linschoten On Falling Asleep, 89; Dan Zahavi Sleep, Self-
Awareness and Dissociation. 
38. Traumloser Schlaf ist ein äußerster Limes, im Einschlafen sich vorzeichnend (HuMa VIII, 337). 
39. Im Dunkel verarmt der Bewusstseinsgehalt, dunkles Gesichtsfeld, im Bett verarmt der 
taktuelle Gehalt, ein gleichmäßiges Empfinden [] Die Sinnesfelder völlig einförmig 
(Manuscript B II 2/6a). 




Nevertheless, falling asleep is significantly different from the described 
retentional awareness exactly because of its all-encompassing character. The 
universality of the impoverishment of affective relief and interest pertains 
not only to the retained but to what is given at present as well. That is, when 
falling asleep, I cease to be affected by and awake towards what is given in 
the impressional now; with my falling asleep towards what normally affects 
the most, namely the here and now, the potentiality or horizon of my 
becoming affected by what I am only implicitly or potentially aware of 
disappears as well. I am not aware of potential cogitationes as they are 
motivated by my current actual directedness; there is no such wakeful 
engagement and, consequently, there is also not a promise of any further 
engagement of the same or another kind. Even if one speaks of potentiality 
with regard to genuine sleep in the sense that I can wake up from sleep, 
while asleep, I am not aware of this potentiality. In other words, the 
potentiality of waking up is not motivated by sleep in the same way that, for 
example, the perception of the back of the object or the recollection of my 
past is motivated by my present awareness of the front of the object or of 
what awakens the retention. 
The fundamental difference between sleep and latent intentional 
awareness also shows forth in the fact that one does not awaken sleep as one 
awakens an implicit awareness  one can only awaken from sleep. While my 
implicit awareness can at any moment take on the form of an explicit 
awareness, waking up is not a modification of an implicit consciousness into 
an explicit consciousness. When asleep, I am not only asleep with regard to 
specific objects, tasks, or events, but with regard to the world or horizon at 
large. As Husserl writes, falling asleep is not just a mere fading out of the 
perceptual present for us []; rather, it entails a fading out of the presence 
of the world for us, i.e. of the being of what is worldly in its total way of 
being a background and with regard to all temporal modes, thus also past 
and future.40 Conversely, when waking up, the world awakens with me : 
When waking up, my bed, so to say, also wakes up, my body in the bed, 
the bedroom and awakened is the horizon of the past.41 
In the concluding section, I would like to show that the proposed account 
of genuine sleep as characterized by the absence of the ego and its horizon of 
possible cogitationes provides the basis on which to account for the difference 
                                                                          
40. Schwinden der Wahrnehmungsgegenwart für uns [] sondern der Weltgegenwart für uns, 
d.i. des Daseins von Weltlichem für uns in seiner ganzen Hintergründlichkeit und nach allen 
Zeitmodis, also auch der Vergangenheit und Zukunft (Manuscript A VI 14a/10a-b). 
41. Erwachend erwacht sozusagen mein Bett, mein Leib im Bett, das Schlafzimmer, und 
geweckt ist der Horizont der Vergangenheit (Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen 
Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass 





between the consciousness of dreaming that occurs when asleep and any 
wakeful intentional awareness.42 
4. Dreaming : Intentionality in Spite of a Waking Ego 
As some more and less recent phenomenological studies on dreaming 
have elaborated, Husserl explicitly addresses the issue of the nature of the 
experience of dreaming on at least one occasion in a letter to Jean Hering in 
reaction to Herings reflections on dreams.43 We can infer from Husserls 
response to Hering that Husserl thinks that dreaming is a kind of imagining 
that occurs when asleep. Like imagining, the experience of dreaming is 
characterized by a peculiar kind of intentional implication, namely the 
implication of a consciousness dreamt in the dreaming consciousness. That 
is, like imagining, to dream is to have a present dream-consciousness in 
which a perceptual experience (the experience dreamt) is reproduced. 
More technically, both when imagining and dreaming, I presentify 
(vergegenwärtige) a scene or event as if I were perceiving it. This peculiar 
structure of the presentifying consciousness also implies that the one 
dreaming must be distinguished from the one perceiving in the dream just 
as the one imagining must be distinguished from the one imaginatively 
perceiving a certain event.44 Further, it is clear that the perceptual 
                                                                          
42. What is left open and unaccounted for is how, if one argues that genuine sleep consists in 
the cessation of both foreground-consciousness and background-consciousness, my retained 
past can be available to me again upon awakening. This seems to have to imply that the past 
continued to be retained during our sleep and that genuine sleep would after all not be that 
different from sleep within wakefulness. Nevertheless, it seems that the ongoing retention of 
our past during sleep cannot be called a latent form of intentionality, since while asleep it 
cannot be awakened or become patent since there is nothing that affects enough as to associate 
with the retained. For the question of retention during sleep, see Matthieu Mavridis, Nuit 
Noire. Sommeil monadique et nudité de lego in Alter. Revue de Phénoménologie, 5, 1997, 212. 
43. See the correspondence with Jean Hering in Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel. Die Göttinger 
Schule, Elisabeth & Karl Schuhmann (eds.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994). Henceforth BW III. These 
letters were translated into French and published in Alter. Revue de Phénoménologie, 5, 1997; see 
also Philippe Ducat, Le sujet du rêve. Présentation de la correspondance Husserl/Héring, 
Alter. Revue de phénoménologie, 5, 1997, 175-185. In the latter there is also a reference to Eugen 
Finks reflections on the consciousness of dreaming, see § 26 of Eugen Fink, 
Vergegenwärtigung und Bild, in Studien zur Phänomenologie. 1930-1939. In a recent work in 
progress, Nicolas de Warren has also developed a phenomenological account of the dreaming 
mind starting from Husserls few indications about dreaming in his letter to Hering. 
44. Das Traumweltich träumt nicht, es nimmt wahr. Man darf nicht einwenden, dass doch 
bewusstseinsmässig das erwachende Ich dasselbe ist, das in der Traumwelt das und das erlebt, 
getan etc. hat, also geträumtes; und nicht ein anderer. Es ist ähnlich wie wenn ich mir 
fingiere, ich wäre im Himmel und lebte dort wie der Herrgott in Frankreich, auch hier bin ich 
derselbe, nämlich kein zweiter Mensch, aber es ist auch da scharf zu unterschieden das 
wirkliche Ich mit seinen wirklichen Erlebnissen, Vermögen etc. und das fingierte Ich mit den 
fingierten (BW III, 119). 




experience that I reproduce in the as-if mode while dreaming is necessarily 
awake. Indeed, Husserl writes to Hering, Sleep cannot be dreamt.45 The 
dreaming consciousness, the enactment itself, however, occurs while asleep 
(in contrast to merely imagining or any other wakeful intentional act). 
Considering Husserls characterization of wakefulness in terms of the ego 
being awake, to say that we are not awake while we dream amounts to 
stating that the act of dreaming is not a cogitatio in which the ego lives. 
Indeed, Husserl at one point describes the state of dreaming as characterized 
by a certain Ichverlassenheit.46 How can this peculiar absence of the ego 
and what we have seen about wakeful consciousness help us to understand 
the difference between the consciousness of dreaming and other forms of 
presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) that occur when we are awake such as 
purely imagining something, recollecting something, or even day-dreaming 
and thereby help us to better understand in what wakefulness actually 
consists?  
It seems that dreaming while asleep is not just characterized by the 
absence of the ego, but first and foremost by the lack of its freedom to direct 
itself elsewhere or to come to live in different acts than the act it is presently 
engaged in. That is, as we have seen, to be awake is not merely to be 
attentively directed at something within the world, but to have a whole 
range of other potential cogitationes directed at what appears or previously 
appeared within this world. That the dreaming consciousness is asleep 
entails that there is no horizon of other possible acts of consciousness 
besides the dreaming.47 Correlatively, while asleep, I am deaf for the 
affections of all worldly objectivities and I am delivered to the dream-world. 
On the other hand, when lost in day-dreaming or imagining, I am never 
unaffected by the world outside the dream and I will never be caught in a 
dream like I will be when I am asleep. Stated otherwise, while I might 
be sunken in a daydream, for as long as I am not asleep, the affecting 
surrounding world and the concomitant potentiality of directing oneself at 
                                                                          
45. Wesensgesetzlich sind alle Traumweltiche im Wachzustand. Schlaf kann nicht geträumt 
werden (BW III, 119). Fink agrees on this point with Husserl: Während das träumende Ich 
schläft, ist das Traumweltich wesensmäßig immer ein waches Ich, das in seine wirkliche Welt 
hineinlebt, hineinerfährt (Fink, Studien zur Phänomenologie. 1930-1939, 65). 
46. Aus dem dumpfen Träumen erwachend, können wir einen reflektierenden Blick 
zurücklenken, das soeben Vergangene in seiner Dumpfheit und Ichverlassenheit erfassen, in 
seiner Verlassenheit von dem aktiven, zu fassenden, denkenden, wachend leidenden usw. Ich 
(Manuscript F III 1/243b). See also Hua IV, 107. 
47. That there is no awareness of a possible awareness beyond the dreaming seems also to be 
implied by what Fink says in the following passage: Der Traum ist nach unserer These eine 
Vergegenwärtigung, die sich in der Gegenwärtigkeit des schlafenden und d.h. des träumenden 
Ich vollzieht. Wie immer diese Gegenwärtigkeit zu fassen sein mag, wesentlich ist für sie, daß 
sich in ihr keine anderen Erlebnisse konstituieren können als eben nur Vergegenwärtigungen. 
Jedes andere gegenwärtigende Erlebnis hebt mindestens partiell den Schlaf auf (Fink, Studien 





what affects are always still given. It is, as the case of day-dreaming shows, 
not as much the absence of the ego as it is the absence of affection and the 
potentiality to become attentive to something beyond the dreaming that 
distinguishes dreaming at night from any wakeful presentifying intentionality. 
Husserl himself at one point considers the phenomenon of day-dreaming 
in the form of one being absorbed in the recollection of a certain event and 
distinguishes this self-forgetful recollecting from a recollection in which I 
bring back to mind times past in a purposeful and directed manner.48 While 
in the latter case, I, in light of the present to which I am awake, recall a 
past event,49 the self-forgetful day-dreaming is, according to Husserl, 
characterized by a peculiar absence of the ego. When immersed in the 
reliving of a past episode of wakeful life, I am no longer awake for the 
present in which the recollection is enacted. Since the current present has 
lost all thematic interest for me, none of the current lived-experiences occurs 
in the form of egoic intentionality. There is nothing in the present 
surroundings towards which I am attentively awake; there is no ego out of 
which patent intentional rays of interested and attentive engagement 
radiate. Consequently, the recollecting occurring in such an ego-less present 
is also self-forgetful and egoless. As Husserl writes : 
I am totally absorbed in the recollection or dreaming, that is, my current stream of 
lived-experiencing is in a peculiar way ego-less, without actual egoic acts that from 
within the now, the perceptual present, are directed at something present and by 
means of a current presentification are directed at what is past; however lively the 
life that is absorbed in the recollection might be and even though this life is 
accomplished in present acts, the present is not a thematic present and the one lost 
in dreaming has no thematic present as he is not aware of this present and of 
himself.50 
                                                                          
48. Hua XI, 306-309. 
49. Unser seiner Gegenwart bewußtes Ich sendet nun den thematischen Blick in die 
Erinnerung, d.h. vom Hier und Jetzt auf das, was ihm im jetzigen wirklichen Erlebnis der 
Erinnerung vorschwebt, und das ist Erinnerung im zweiten Sinn: Ein ganzes Stück vergangenes 
Ichleben ist vergegenwärtigt mit dem, was damals als erfahrene Außenwelt, als Theater usw. 
gegenüberstand. Vom Jetzt aus blickt das wache Ich geradehin auf dies Ding oder vollzieht, 
immer im Rahmen der Vergegenwärtigung selbst, Reflexion auf die vergangenen Akte, 
Erscheinungen usw. (Hua XI, 307). 
50. Ich lebe ganz versunken in Erinnerung, träumend, das heißt, mein gegenwärtiger 
Erlebnisstrom ist in eigener Weise ichlos, ohne wirkliche Ichakte, die vom Jetzt her, der 
wahrnehmungsmäßigen Gegenwart, auf Jetziges und durch bewußt jetzige Vergegenwärtigung 
hindurch auf Vergangenes zugehen; so lebensvoll das versunkene Leben in der Erinnerung ist 
und sosehr dieses Leben in gegenwärtigen Akten sich abspielt, so ist diese Gegenwart doch 
keine thematische Gegenwart, der Traumverlorene hat überhaupt keine thematische 
Gegenwart, er ist nicht wach für sie und für sich selbst. Erst mit dem Erwachen leuchtet im 
Bewusstseinsstrom die Sonne des zentralen Ich als Ausstrahlungszentrum wirklicher Akte, und 




This self-forgetful recollecting or day-dreaming is, however, not a form of 
consciousness that is genuinely asleep. That is, while the act of day-
dreaming is like the act of genuine dreaming in the sense that it is egoless 
and there is only an ego insofar as the dreamt event is one that is perceived 
by a dreamt ego,51 it is in another respect very different from dreaming at 
night. That is, when absorbed in recollecting a certain event, I still have a 
latent intentional awareness of my present surroundings, even though I am 
absorbed in the recollected past. Even when immersed in a day-dream, the 
surrounding world still appears, even though it fails to affect me sufficiently 
as to effectively solicit an interested directedness. When asleep and 
dreaming, however, I do not have such latent intentional awareness of the 
presence of the world. 
Thus, when living the dreaming consciousness, I have no awareness of 
anything beyond this consciousness, no awareness of a horizon of other 
possible givenness than what is given in the act of dreaming. Because of the 
lack of an awareness of what is beyond what is being dreamt, no distance 
whatsoever can be taken towards what is experienced in the dream. Such a 
distance would imply a dreaming ego that could detach itself from the 
dreamt ego and what is dreamt simply by asserting its freedom and 
independence from the dreamt ego by performing an egoic act and in this 
way turning away from what is dreamt towards something else and thereby 
interrupting the dreaming. It is exactly this freedom that characterizes 
wakeful life and which makes it possible to interrupt at will any episode of 
self-forgetful daydreaming. When awake, I always have the freedom to 
redirect my gaze to what affects me within the present and to what I 
previously did not pay attention. When asleep, this freedom to actualize the 
horizon of my possible other forms of receptive awareness is lacking since, 
as I have tried to elaborate, during sleep the ego and, most importantly, the 
horizon of its potentiality disappear. Consequently, the one dreaming at 
night and still sound asleep is without awareness, even a latent one, of what 
is beyond what is dreamt. 
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nun erst verwandeln sich auch die Erinnerungserlebnisse in solche, die im aktuellen jetzigen Ich 
zentrierte sind, in wirkliche Akte des ich erinnere mich (Hua XI, 309). 
51. Jetzt haben wir die Traumverlorenheit in der besonderen Form der Erinnerungs-
verlorenheit kennengelernt, die nicht ichlos ist, wie die Hintergrundphänomene, deren Ich aber, 
sosehr es wirklich mein Ich ist, nämlich bewußt ist als mein gestriges Ich, doch nur 
vergegenwärtigtes und nicht ein jetziges, aktuell tätiges Ich ist (Hua XI, 308). 
